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This information was originally published as MAN-0001, GIS Operations and Maintenance Manual. |
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DANGER Failure to follow the procedures detailed in this manual can result in death or serious injury. Only authorized persons may perform the procedures detailed in this manual. | ||||||||
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NOTICE Failure to follow the procedures detailed in this manual can result in damage to equipment. Only authorized persons may perform the procedures detailed in this manual. |
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Only personnel who have been specifically trained and authorized shall perform the procedures detailed in this manual.
Related Documents
Reference Documents
Many of the components of the GIS are covered by manufacturer’s user manuals.
Safety Symbols
Standardized safety alerts are used to denote procedures or activities that are potentially hazardous.
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NOTICE Indicates information considered important, but not hazard related (e.g. messages relating to property damage) |
Glossary
See SPEC-0012 for terms and abbreviations not listed below.
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Fault
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abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function.[1]
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Trip
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a reaction to an interlock that puts the system in a safe state.
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Mute
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Temporarily ignore an interlock condition.
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Override
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Validation
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checking to make sure the function works in the event of a failure
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Verification
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checking to make sure the function works as intended
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Force
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A method in the RSLogix environment to change I/O to certain value regardless of logic
Overview
Emergency Stop System
Trapped Key System
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WARING Trapped keys are not a substitute for lock out/tag out. Failure to follow lock out/tag out procedures can result in death or serious injury. |
Trapped keys prevent unauthorized entry into hazardous areas and prevents unexpected start-up of equipment when persons are in hazardous areas.
Only one key exists for each device. This is by design and essential to maintaining a safe system. Trapped keys must never leave the facility.
Human Machine Interface (HMI)
Terms used on the HMI
It is necessary to define terms that are used with the operator interface.
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Indication
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Meaning
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TRIP or TRIPPED
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An interlock has been activated
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FAULT
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A hardware malfunction has been detected
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ERROR
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Communications has been lost, status is unknown
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INVALID
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The system appears to be in a state it should never be in.
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OK
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Everything is operating normally, no interlock has been activated
Levels of authorization
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Level
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Access
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Viewer
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Read-only access to status screens
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Operator
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Read/write access to status screens
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Engineer
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Read/write access to status and engineering screens
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Developer
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Read/write access to all screens
2.1.3 Sample Screens
The representative basic operator troubleshooting screen is Figure 1. This screen shows that an emergency stop has been activated and has tripped the system. The system cannot be reset at this time as the interlock is still active.
Figure 1 HMI showing interlock tripped
If more information is required, such as the location of the emergency stop device that has been activated further troubleshooting screens trace the fault further back. Figure 2 shows that the emergency stop push button located at the Left Nasmyth Platform has been activated.
Figure 2 HMI Emergency Stop Screen
After the emergency stop push button has been deactivated, the interlock condition has been removed. A reset is now required to restart the system. Figure 3 shows that the interlock has been latched, the interlock is no longer active and that the GIS is now ready to be reset.
Figure 3 HMI showing reset required
Figure 4 shows the system has been restored to its normal operating condition.
Figure 4 HMI showing normal operation
Telescope Interlock Manager (TIM)
Main Screen
The main screen allows the selection of system information, subsystem information or alarm history. There is also a button for shutting down the HMI, for example to reload or reset the HMI itself.
Global Interlock Controller Screen
The Global Interlock Controller screen provides an overview of the GIC status and subsystem status. The information provided for each controller is the current program name, status of controller communications with HMI, the controller status itself, keyswitch mode, safety status, safety signature, and CIP synchronization status.
2.1.4.2.1 Program Name
2.1.4.2.2 Controller Communications
This represents whether the device is present on the network as detected by the HMI. If the device is not present, ensure that power is on to the controller and the network is connected.
2.1.4.2.3 Controller Status
OK The controller has detected no faults.
2.1.4.2.4 Keyswitch mode
RUN The keyswitch is in the run position. The PLC will run normally but cannot be programed or changed remotely.
PROG The keyswitch is in the program position. The PLC is not running.
REM RUN The keyswitch is in the remote position. And is in the run mode.
REM PROG The keyswitch is in the remote position. And is in the program mode. The PLC is not running. Connect using RSLogix 5000 and change mode to Run.
2.2 Observatory Control System
The observatory control system has access to the status of the various interlocks employed by the GIS. It is intended to allow the operator to determine which interlock has tripped and is preventing the operation of the facility. It is not intended to replicate all information available at the GIS HMI or via a development computer on the safety network. The HMI can provide detailed troubleshooting information in the event of a fault.
2.3 Control Room Stack Light
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Figure 5 Control Room Stack Light
A wall-mounted signal light is located in the control room. The signal lights are designed to communicate the status of various conditions within the safety system. It consists of five colored lamps (red, amber, green, blue, clear). It also contains a piezo sounder (70 to 90 dbA).
Multiple lamps could be lit depending on the condition of the safety system. The meaning of the lamps are listed in Table 2‑1.
Table 2‑1 Functions Indicated by Stack Lights
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Color
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Function
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Steady On
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Flashing
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Red
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Critical Event
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Emergency stop
Controller fault
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Stopping in progress
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Amber
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Warning
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Hazardous Zone accessed
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Safety muting
Manual bypass
I/O forced
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Green
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Safety
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Safe state achieved
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Blue
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Attention
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Maintenance required
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Reset required
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Clear (white)
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Operational
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Normal operations
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Speed limited
Cold Start up
When power is first applied or re-applied to the system, it will likely cause the system to generate a large number of faults. This is mainly due to the fact that the EtherNet switches of the safety system take substantially longer to boot than the PLCs themselves.
If the safety system was working properly prior to the loss of power and the reason for the loss of power is understood, the quickest way to restore the safety system to normal operations is to cycle the individual LICs power or perform a RUN-PROG-RUN reset by turning the keyswitch from ‘run’ to ‘program’ and back to ‘run’ (This can also be done remotely if the keyswitch is in the ‘remote’ mode).
Normal Operations
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WARNING Failure to follow the procedures detailed in this section can result in death or serious injury. Only authorized persons may perform the procedures detailed in this section. |
During normal operations, the GIS does not require any operator interaction. Operator intervention is required only when the GIS enters a tripped or faulted state.
Logging
The GIS logs various events for troubleshooting purposes. Events to be logged include trips and faults in the system. The logs are timestamped in UTC synchronized to the observatory-wide TRADS system. The logs are kept on the a FactoryTalk Historian module located in the GIC rack. This module can be remotely accessed. The HMI also stores a number of alarms.
Resetting an tripped Interlock
In most cases, trips of the GIS can be reset by using the HMI (Human Machine Interface) to access password-protected screens. Certain trips may be more serious than others and may require higher authorization before proceeding.
Procedures require that the reason for all trips be investigated and understood before proceeding with a reset. The reset does not cause hazardous motion to resume; rather it allows the subsystem that tripped to be restarted.
Hazardous Area Access
Hazardous areas may be entered for various routine reasons. Personnel doing so must ensure that all personnel have left the hazardous area before securing it.
Hazardous areas may also be entered during an emergency. For example, the doors leading to the external ladders may be used to evacuate the building. By their vary nature they cannot be locked with trapped key or must be equipped with an override device.
These two types of tripped interlocks are very different. Normal access using a trapped key may be reset by personnel returning the trapped key in the proper sequence. In the second non-routine case, it would be necessary to inspect the hazardous area and ensure no personnel or other hazards are present prior to attempting to reset this type of tripped interlock.
Trapped Keys
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WARING Trapped keys are not a substitute for lock out/tag out. Failure to follow lock out/tag out procedures can result in death or serious injury. |
Trapped keys prevent unauthorized entry into hazardous areas and prevents unexpected start-up of equipment when persons are in hazardous areas.
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Procedures
Cold Start up
When power is first applied or re-applied to the system, it will likely cause the system to generate a large number of faults. This is mainly due to the fact that the EtherNet switches of the safety system take substantially longer to boot than the PLCs themselves.
If the safety system was working properly prior to the loss of power and the reason for the loss of power is understood, the quickest way to restore the safety system to normal operations is to cycle the individual LICs power or perform a RUN-PROG-RUN reset by turning the keyswitch from ‘run’ to ‘program’ and back to ‘run’ (This can also be done remotely if the keyswitch is in the ‘remote’ mode).
Functional test of Guard Locking Switch
Guard Locking switches if tripped require that both the fault be cleared AND a functional test of the Guard Lock.
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Guard Lock Switch can become faulted if someone attempts to force open a locked door or uses the emergency escape release mechanism. |
Ensure door is closed.
Reset GIS.
Verify that no fault is present. Diagnostic code will remain.
Lock door (if necessary).
Unlock door.
Open door.
Close door
Verify that no fault is present and there are no diagnostic codes.
Lock door (if necessary).
Normal Operations
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WARNING Failure to follow the procedures detailed in this section can result in death or serious injury. Only authorized persons may perform the procedures detailed in this section. |
During normal operations, the GIS does not require any operator interaction. Operator intervention is required only when the GIS enters a tripped or faulted state.
Logging
The GIS logs various events for troubleshooting purposes. Events to be logged include trips and faults in the system. The logs are timestamped in UTC synchronized to the observatory-wide TRADS system. The logs are kept on the a FactoryTalk Historian module located in the GIC rack. This module can be remotely accessed. The HMI also stores a number of alarms.
Resetting an tripped Interlock
In most cases, trips of the GIS can be reset by using the HMI (Human Machine Interface) to access password-protected screens. Certain trips may be more serious than others and may require higher authorization before proceeding.
Procedures require that the reason for all trips be investigated and understood before proceeding with a reset. The reset does not cause hazardous motion to resume; rather it allows the subsystem that tripped to be restarted.
Hazardous Area Access
Hazardous areas may be entered for various routine reasons. Personnel doing so must ensure that all personnel have left the hazardous area before securing it.
Hazardous areas may also be entered during an emergency. For example, the doors leading to the external ladders may be used to evacuate the building. By their vary nature they cannot be locked with trapped key or must be equipped with an override device.
These two types of tripped interlocks are very different. Normal access using a trapped key may be reset by personnel returning the trapped key in the proper sequence. In the second non-routine case, it would be necessary to inspect the hazardous area and ensure no personnel or other hazards are present prior to attempting to reset this type of tripped interlock.
Muting an Interlock
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WARNING Muting an interlock can create a hazardous situation that, if not avoided, can result in death or serious injury. Alternative means must be taken to ensure the safety of persons. Failure to perform a Job Hazard Analysis or follow proper procedures can result in death or serious injury. |
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Certain operations may be required and interlocks may need to be bypassed to allow emergency operations, such as freeing personnel entrapped in a pinch/crush hazard. [TRW2]
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WARNING By-passing an interlock can create a hazardous situation that, if not avoided, can result in death or serious injury. Alternative means must be taken to ensure the safety of persons. |
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An example of validation would be adding an emergency switch would be shorting each of the two inputs to ground, shorting both inputs together, shorting both inputs to 24VDC and checking to see if all systems fault to a safe state.
9 rEFERENCE
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[1] IEC 61508-4 3.6.1
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[TRW1]http://manualise.com/en/blog/law-and-legislation/ansi-z535-6/
[TRW2]GISFRR-22
[t3]GISFRR-112